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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000495-CA
Priority No. 2

ERIC JARVIS WARREN,
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1999), in
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Sheila K. McCleve, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred

upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e)
(1996).

See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I. Did the trial court err in concluding that the stop and
frisk of Mr. Warren did not violate his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure?
Standard of Review: " f The factual findings underlying a
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress
evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness,
with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's
application of the legal standard to the facts. f " State v.
Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 5 6, 994 P.2d 1278 (quotation omitted).

II.

Can the lower court's order be affirmed under the

inevitable discovery doctrine where the State did not meet its
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence?
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial court's order on
a motion to suppress evidence, we recount the facts in a light
most advantageous to the trial court's decision."

State v.

James, 1999 UT App 17, f 2, 977 P.2d 489.
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Eric Warren's ("Mr. Warren") challenge to the
traffic stop and Terry frisk are preserved on the record for
appeal PR.") at 43-44, 47, 49-56, 130-31.

His objection to the

application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is preserved at
R.131[17-18].
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provision is determinative of
the issues on appeal:
United States Constitution Amendment IV - Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.

2

Mr. Warren was charged by information with two counts of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); one
count of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1999);
and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (Supp.
1999).

R.14-16.

An arrest warrant was issued.

R.12.

Mr. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that formed the
basis of the charges as the fruit of an unconstitutional search
and seizure.

R.43-44, 47, 49-56, 130-31.

He argued that the

officer detained him beyond the reasonable scope of the traffic
stop and that the subsequent frisk was unreasonable.
10].

R.131[3-

The State countered that the stop was not unduly prolonged

and that the frisk was justified under the circumstances.
R.131[10-14] .
The State alternatively argued that the evidence was
admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
14].

R.131[13-

The State alleged that a gun, found in Mr. Warren's car,

would have been discovered during an inventory search of the
impounded vehicle.

R.131[13].

Consequently, Mr. Warren would

have been arrested for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon and
searched, leading to discovery of the drugs on his person.

Id.

Mr. Warren asserted that the doctrine did not apply because
the State did not present any evidence about a gun during the
3

suppression hearings.

R.131[17-18].

The trial court denied the suppression motion, holding that
the stop did not exceed the scope and the frisk was justified
under the circumstances.

R.64-65; 131[18-19].

reach the Statefs inevitability argument.

The court did not

R.131[18].

Mr. Warren entered a conditional guilty plea to possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), pursuant to Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 (i) (2000) and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah App. 1988).

R.100-07, 111. Mr. Warren appeals from the

denial of the suppression motion.

R.112-13.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At approximately 4:45 a.m. on November 28, 1999, Officer
Nathan Swensen ("Swensen") was driving toward his assigned patrol
area of 900 South to 1700 South and 300 East to Main Street.
R.130[4-5].

Around 170 South and 200 East, Swensen observed a

gray Cadillac pulled over to the side of the road.

R.130[5].

A

person, later identified as Mr. Warren, was in the driver's seat;
another unidentified individual leaned into the front passenger
window with the door open.
walked away.

R.130[6].

Id.

The individual shut the door and

Swensen testified that the individual

did not do anything suspicious as he walked off.

R.130[15].

Swensen, who observed this activity for less than a minute, did
not hear any of the conversation that took place, he could not

4

tell what the people were doing, nor did he recognize the car
from prior suspicious circumstances.

R.130[6,15].

Nonetheless,

Swensen suspected either drug or prostitution related activity
given the early hour and the fact that there were no open
businesses or residences in the vicinity.

R.130[6-7].

Swensen observed Mr. Warren pull away from the curb and make
a left hand turn onto 200 South, and then a lane change, without
signaling.

R.130[6].

of the violations.

Swensen initiated a traffic stop because

R.130[7].

Swensen said his suspicions did

not factor into his decision to pull Mr. Warren over.

R.130[16].

However, he did hope to question Mr. Warren about the previously
observed activity.

Id.

Swensen informed Mr. Warren that he pulled him over for
failing to signal.

R.130[8].

He requested Mr. Warren's driver's

license and vehicle registration.

Id.

Mr. Warren handed

Swensen his registration and license without any hassle.
Swensen noticed that the license expired in 1995.

Id.

Id.

Mr.

Warren explained that he had a current license that had been
recently stolen.

Id.

Swensen asked Mr. Warren about the other individual, what
they were doing, why at that time, and whether he dropped the man
off or just met him.

R.130[9].

Swensen admitted that these

questions were unrelated to and unnecessary for the effectuation
of the traffic stop.

R.130[18].

Mr. Warren told Swensen that

his mother and the man's mother were acquaintances.
5

R.130[9].

He dropped the man off at 170 South 200 East after they had been
together at someone's house.

Id.

Mr. Warren also stated that he

was looking for packing boxes for his sister who was moving.
This line of questioning lasted one to two minutes.

Id.

R.130[18].

Swensen went to his patrol car, checked Mr. Warren's
license, and learned that it was current but had been denied for
reinstatement fees, meaning that the license was invalid.
R.130[8-9].

Swensen then decided to impound Mr. Warren's car.

R.130[10].

He asked Mr. Warren to get out of the car to sign a

citation for failure to signal and for driving without a valid
license.

R.130[10].

Swensen testified that he did not intend to

arrest Mr. Warren, and had him step out of the car only to inform
him about the impound and to sign the citations.
Swensen next frisked Mr. Warren.

R.130[10].

R.130[21-22].
He testified

that he did not suspect Mr. Warren to be armed or dangerous, but
that he frisks everyone as a matter of routine.

R.130[10,20] .

He also explained that people involved in drugs and prostitution
are usually armed.

R.130[10].

A white plastic twist, later

identified as cocaine, fell from Mr. Warren's waist during the
frisk.

R.84,130[20-21].

Further search of Mr. Warren's person

revealed another twist of cocaine, some methamphetamine, and a
clear glass pipe.

R.84; see Addendum B (Written Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law). 1
1

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the
trial court's order denying Mr. Warren's motion to suppress. See
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Warren's motion to
suppress the drugs that were illegally seized in violation of his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.
See United States Const, amend. IV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 14.
The search and seizure was illegal because the searching officer
went beyond the legitimate scope of the traffic stop, see State
v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 994 P.2d 1278; State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127 (Utah 1994), and then frisked Mr. Warren without any
reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.

See Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Moreover, the evidence is not admissible under the
inevitable discovery doctrine.

See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.

431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

The doctrine does

not apply because the State did not meet its burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that a gun was found in the car
which would have led to Mr. Warren's arrest and subsequent
search, or that the drugs otherwise inevitably would have been
found on him.

Id. at 444.
ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. WARREN
WAS NOT SEARCHED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
WHERE THE OFFICER EXCEEDED THE LEGITIMATE SCOPE OF A
TRAFFIC STOP AND DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE SUSPICION
THAT MR. WARREN WAS ARMED AND DANGEROUS WHEN HE FRISKED

State v. Ziealeman, 905 P.2d 883, 884 (Utah 1995).
7

HIM.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."
(same).

See also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14

"The Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable

searches and seizures applies to investigatory stops of vehicles,
regardless of the reason for the stop or the brevity of the
detention."

State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App.

1997) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct.
1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)).
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment
is always

f

the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the

particular government invasion of a citizen's personal
security.1" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct.
330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.I, 19,
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
The traffic stop at issue here was conducted in violation of
Mr. Warren's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure because it exceeded the reasonable scope of a traffic
stop, .see Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, If

8-9; Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132,

and the subsequent Terry frisk was not legally based on a
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Warren was armed and dangerous.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, see also United State's Const,
amend. IV; see also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14.
8

Hence, the trial

court erred in denying Mr. Warren's motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of the illegal search and seizure.

See Mapp

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)
(requiring exclusion of evidence illegally seized by state agents
in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
A. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the
Detention Did Not Exceed the Reasonable Scope of the
Traffic Stop.
"[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in
stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a
traffic violation committed in the officers'
presence.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah
1994) (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990)). "[A]s long as an officer suspects
that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the
police officer may legally stop the vehicle." Id.
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)); see also
State v. Spuraeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (providing that equipment violations are traffic
violations justifying investigative stop by law
enforcement)....
"Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.' " Lopez, 873 P.2d
at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500,
103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). If there
is investigative questioning that detains the driver
beyond the scope of the initial stop, it "must be
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means
suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn
from the totality of the circumstances facing the
officer at the time of the stop." Id. If the officer
reasonably suspects more serious criminal activity,
"the scope of the stop is still limited." Id. The
officer must "diligently pursue[ ] a means of
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel
[his or her] suspicions quickly, during which time it
[is] necessary to detain the defendant." State v.
Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah [] App. 1991).
9

State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 11 8-10, 994 P.2d 1278.
The trial court made the following findings in concluding
that the traffic stop of Mr. Warren was constitutional:
The brief questioning of the defendant regarding the
unidentified individual seen leaning into the
defendant's vehicle did not exceed the scope of the
initial traffic stop in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Such brief questioning was reasonable and
based on the officer[f]s personal observation and
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in other
criminal activity such as drugs or prostitution.
R.84-85.

The trial court erred in concluding that the officer

did not exceed the legitimate scope of the traffic stop.

See

Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, 11 8-9.
First, the stop exceeded its legitimate scope because
Swensen's questioning was not necessary to "'effectuate1" it.
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quotation omitted).

"As to length of a

permissible detention, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has held that the
detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate

the purpose of the stop.'"

State v. Fiaueroa-

Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Florida v.
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983))
(emphasis added).

Swensen testified that the investigative

questioning concerning Mr. Warren's pre-traffic violation
activity was unrelated to and unnecessary to effectuate the stop.
R.130[18].

Hence, by Swensen's own admission, the stop violated

the Fourth Amendment since the questioning was unrelated to the
stop and prolonged the detention beyond the time "'necessary to
10

effectuate [its] purpose. 1 "

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quotation

omitted); see also Rover, 460 U.S. at 280-81.
The fact that the questioning lasted one or two minutes, or
that it occurred during an ongoing traffic stop, does not remedy
the violation.

R.130[18].

The length of the delay caused by

investigative questioning, or whether it occurs during an ongoing stop, alone are not dispositive of reasonableness;
reasonable suspicion arises only when other suspicious
circumstances accompany those facts.

See Fiqueroa-Solorio, 830

P.2d at 280-81 (fact that questioning during stop for jay walking
lasted two or three minutes was only one factor going toward
reasonableness; other factor included permissible warrants check
revealing outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest); State v.
O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998) (fact that inspection
of car occurred during ongoing traffic stop, in addition to
defendant's "furtive movements," "questionable explanation," and
"admission" that he had weapon, justified added detention).
"[R]ather than focusing solely on the length of the detention,
this court has held there is no ''bright line rule as to the
acceptable length of a detention because 'common sense and
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.''1"
State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations
omitted).
The ultimate inquiry goes to the reasonableness

11

of the

questioning under the totality of the circumstances, for "even a
small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially
lawful search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment."

State v.

Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987))
(mere opening of car door exceeded legitimate scope of traffic
stop).

This Court's decision in State v. Matison, 875 P.2d 584

(Utah App. 1994), is instructive on the issue of reasonableness
in this case and compels the conclusion that Swensen's
questioning went beyond the legal scope of the traffic stop.
In Matison, the officer observed defendant "fishtail while
exiting the interstate."

Id. at 585.

at a nearby convenience store.

Id.

He then saw defendant stop

The officer

drove to the area where the incident had occurred and
determined that it was not the result of hazardous road
conditions. However, he did nothing more concerning
the incident even though he was aware of defendant's
location; instead, he proceeded away from the site of
the incident. He later stopped defendant only because,
by mere happenstance, defendant was traveling in the
same direction as [the officer].
Id. at 587.

The officer "testified that he decided to stop the

vehicle [at that point] to determine whether the driver was
impaired or why the driver was unable to control the vehicle
while exiting the interstate [earlier]."

Id. at 586.

The Court held the stop was not "f'justified at its
inception 1f " because it was not premised on a legitimate traffic
violation nor a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
12

occurring at the time of the stop.

Id. at 587 (quoting Lopez,

873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20)).

In so

holding, he Court reasoned that although the officer
testified that he stopped the defendant to determine
whether he was impaired or why he was unable to control
the vehicle at the interchange . . . , defendant

clearly

would not have been stopped

had he proceeded

by

another
route.
Had [the officer] continued to
investigate the incident after determining that it was
not caused by road conditions, rather than expressly
abandoning further investigation by proceeding away
from defendant, the stop may have been justified.
Instead, he drove away from Salina and defendant with
no apparent intention of stopping him.
Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
The facts of the present case parallel those in Matison and
similarly highlight that Officer Swensen's questioning was not
grounded in a "reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity . . . based on specific, articulable facts drawn from
the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time
of the stop."

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.

Like the officer in

Matison, Swensen did not stop Mr. Warren on account of the
activity that he observed prior to the traffic stop.

R.130[16].

Rather, he let him drive on "with no apparent intention of
stopping him."

Matison, 875 P.2d at 587.

Swensen stopped Mr.

Warren only after he observed him make a left turn and a lane
change without signaling.

R.130[6-7].

But for the mere

"happenstance" of the subsequent traffic violations, Mr. Warren
"clearly would not have been stopped" and questioned about his
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exchange with the unidentified individual.

Matison, 875 P.2d at

587.
Moreover, the investigative questioning was not justified by
any additional information that came to light after Swensen
initiated the stop.

"[I]nvestigative questioning that detains

the driver beyond the scope of the initial stop . . . 'must be
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity . . . based on specific articulable facts drawn from the
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at
the

stop.

the

time

of

'" Chevre, 2000 UT App at 1 10 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d

at 1132) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Holt, Case
No. 99-7150 (10th Cir. 2000) (officer, during traffic stop,
impermissibly asked defendant about weapons where "questions . .
. [were not] precipitated by reasonable suspicion").
"'[Alt the time of th[is] stop, 1 " Chevre, 2000 UT App, 1 9
(quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132), Swensen only testified that
Mr. Warren pulled over without incident, and willingly and
readily gave over his driver's license and vehicle registration
upon request.

R.130[8].

Swensen did not offer any other

articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug
or prostitution related activity that would justify the
subsequent questioning, such as furtive movements or evasiveness
in a known crime area, see O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649 (visual
inspection of vehicle did not exceed scope of traffic stop where
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officer viewed defendant furtively bend over several times while
pulling over); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508-09 (Utah App.
198 9) (stop legal under Fourth Amendment where defendant was seen
driving evasively through area known for prostitution), or
incoherence or nervousness on Mr. Warren's part.

See Chevre,

2000 UT App at SI 9 (officer legally extended scope of traffic
stop where defendant was incoherent and so nervous that he could
not stop bouncing his foot on car floor).

Accordingly, like

Matison, Swensen did not have a reasonable suspicion to prolong
the traffic stop with investigative questioning about previous
activity that did not form the basis of the stop in the first
place.

See. 875 P.2d at 587.

In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in
concluding that Swensen!s questioning of Mr. Warren did not
exceed the legitimate scope of the traffic stop, and in
consequently failing to suppress the evidence seized.

See

Chevre, 2000 UT App atflfl8-10 (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132);
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.

The questioning was not necessary to

effectuate the purposes of the stop.

Id.

Additionally, Officer

Swensen did not have reasonable suspicion to question defendant
about activity that occurred prior to the traffic stop, and none
of the facts "at the time of the stop" gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion justifying the questioning.

Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.

Accordingly, the stop violated Mr. Warren's Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
15

See

U.S. Const.

amend. IV; see also Utah Const. Art. I, § 14.
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the Terry
Frisk Was Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio held:
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others1
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken.
392 U.S. at 30-31; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1999)
(statutory authorization for Terry frisk).
Terry further notes:
[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the
individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger. Cf. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85
S.Ct. 223, 226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brineaar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302,
1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Stacev v. Emery, 97 U.S.
642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 1035 (1878). And in determining
whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or fhunch,' but
to the specific reasonable inferences which he is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience. Cf. Brineaar[, 338 U.S. at 174-76.]
Id. at 27 (noting in footnote 23 to this excerpt that
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"specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence" (citations omitted)).
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in
upholding the frisk and stop of Mr. Warren.

As an initial

matter, the patdown cannot be justified on the basis that Swensen
frisks every suspect as a matter of routine.
1

R.130[10].

"The

narrow scope1 of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for

weapons on less than a reasonable belief or suspicion directed
the

person

to be frisked."

at

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94,

100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (emphasis added).

A

generalized routine is the exact opposite of the particularized
suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 93-94.

Indeed, on this premise, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ybarra
reversed an order allowing evidence seized during a generalized
protective frisk under analogous circumstances to those of the
case at bar. 444 U.S. at 96.

In Ybarra, the defendant was a

patron in a bar where the bartender was being searched under
warrant for heroin.

Id. at 88-89.

The searching officers

announced that they would "conduct a 'cursory search for
weapons'" on the patrons in the bar as well.

Id. at 88.

Heroine

was found on the defendant as a result of the general frisk.
at 89.
In reversing the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court
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Id.

noted that there was no individualized suspicion that the
defendant was armed or dangerous, and that his "mere propinquity
to others suspected of criminal activity" did not support the
frisk.

Id. at 91, 93.

The Court noted that the officers,

neither recognized him as a person with a criminal
history nor had any particular reason to believe that
he might be inclined to assault them. Moreover, as
Police Agent Johnson later testified, Ybarra, whose
hands were empty, gave no indication of possessing a
weapon, made no gestures or other actions indicative of
an intent to commit an assault, and acted generally in
a manner that was not threatening. At the suppression
hearing, the most Agent Johnson could point to was that
Ybarra was wearing a 3/4-length lumber jacket,
clothing which the State admits could be expected on
almost any tavern patron in Illinois in early March.
In short, the State is unable to articulate any
specific fact that would have justified a police
officer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was
armed and dangerous.
Id. at 93.
As in Ybarra, nothing in the findings of fact from the court
or the testimony of Officer Swensen establishes that the frisk of
Mr. Warren was "supported by a reasonable belief that he
particular]

[in

was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which

this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a
patdown of a person for weapons."

Id. at 92-93 (citing Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612;
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-24).

The lower court made the following

findings in this regard:
The brief "Terry" frisk of defendant for weapons was
not conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Even though the officer stated he did not believe the
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defendant had weapons, the search was supported by an
objective reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed
and dangerous. The search was only conducted for
officer safety and was supported by the following
facts: the lateness of the hour, the area, no other
traffic, no residences in area or open business,
defendant's odd and inconsistent explanation of his
activities, [the] officer[f]s belief defendant was
engaged in drugs or prostitution and that people who
engage in such activity usually carry weapons, the
officer was alone, the officer was going to impound
defendant's vehicle, and defendant's previous false
statement about the status of his license.
R.84-85; see Addendum B (Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law).
First, the frisk was not supported by the officer's belief
that individuals suspected of drug or prostitution related
activity are usually armed given the nature of their crime.
R.84-85.

If the suspected crime is one of violence,

then an

officer may frisk without any more knowledge of the suspect.

See

Wayne R. LeFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth
Amendment § 9.5(a), at 254-60.
This includes such suspected offenses as robbery,
burglary, rape, assault with weapons, homicide and
dealing in large
quantities
of narcotics. In such
circumstances, then, "the officer's reasonable belief
may derive as much from his experience in similar cases
as from his precise knowledge of the dangerous
propensities of the suspect at hand."
Id. at 255-56 (footnotes and quotation omitted) (emphasis added);
see e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (frisk permissible where officer
suspected defendant was involved in a "daylight robbery - which,
it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of
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weapons"); see also State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) (noting that officer might
reasonably frisk people suspected of dealing large quantities of
illegal drugs over long distances because they "might be armed to
protect themselves from criminals who might attempt to f rip-off !
a drug dealer").
But for other types of crimes, such as trafficking
in
small
quantities
of narcotics,
possession of marijuana,
illegal possession of liquor, prostitution,
bookmaking,
shoplifting, underage drinking, driving under the
influence and lesser traffic offenses, minor assault
without weapons, or vagrancy, as well as when the stop
is for a legitimate noncriminal reason, there must be,
as Justice Harlan noted in Terry, "other circumstances"
present.
LeFave, § 9.5(a) at 256-57 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34)
(Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., State v. White, 856 P.2d
656, 665 (Utah App. 1993) ("balancing defendant's right to be
free of unreasonable interference against the police officers1
right to protect themselves or others weighs against validating
an automatic frisk based on [suspected] . . . cocaine use.
Cocaine use is not a crime of violence comparable to dealing in
large quantities of drugs").
In the present case, Swensen only testified generally that
he suspected Mr. Warren of being involved in drugs or
prostitution.

R.130[6-7].

Prostitution, as noted by LeFave, is

not the sort of violent crime giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion of weapons.

See LeFave, § 9.5(a) at 255-56.
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As to

Swensenfs suspicion of drugs, he did not articulate whether he
thought Mr. Warren was a large scale dealer, or simply involved
in a small transaction.

Although the substances subsequently

found on Mr. Warren were later identified in the Probable Cause
Statement as Methamphetamine and Cocaine, R.16, Swensen's
testimony did not specify what kind of drugs he thought Mr.
Warren was involved in.

See generally R.130[3-22].

Such a

paucity of testimony regarding the nature of the suspected
criminal activity does not rise to the level of "articulable
facts" necessary to establish a "rationale inference []" that Mr.
Warren was armed, justifying the frisk of his person.

Terry, 392

U.S. at 21 (warning against "intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches") (citing Beck v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 253, 80
S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959)).
In addition, Swensen did not articulate anything else about
Mr. Warren that supported a reasonable suspicion justifying a
frisk.

Swensen did not articulate that there were any suspicious

bulges on Mr. Warren indicating a weapon, or that he had his hand
in his pocket as if to pull one.

See State v. Rochelle, 850 P.2d

480, 483 (Utah App. 1993) (upholding frisk where defendant "had a
bulge in his pocket"); see United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d
838, 842 (5th Cir. 1994) (defendant kept right hand in pocket,
"precisely where a weapon could be located," even when he opened
21

door and even though he had a beer in other hand).

Swensen also

did not state that Mr. Warren behaved in an evasive or
threatening manner, or that backed away as if to draw a weapon.
See Rochelle, 850 P.2d at 483 ("when asked whether he had any
weapons, [defendant] 'was hesitant in answering n o 1 " ) ; see also
United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (stressing
defendant's "moves took place after a detention, at night, in a
high crime area where the carrying of weapons is common").
If anything, Swensenfs testimony establishes that Mr.
Warren's demeanor and the surrounding circumstances did not
reasonably suggest a risk of harm.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.

First, Swensen himself testified that he did not believe Mr.
Warren was armed at the point he decided to frisk him.
R.130 [20].

Hence, the sole justification for the "narrowly

drawn" exception carved out under Terry - "to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer" - is
not present.

392 U.S. at 27.

Indeed, by Swensen!s own

testimony, the necessity for a weapons frisk dissipated before he
conducted the patdown in that he had already concluded in his
mind that Mr. Warren did not present a threat.

R.130[20].

This

alone compels the conclusion that the need for the search did not
outweigh Mr. Warren's right to be free of such unwarranted
intrusion.

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 ("there is 'no ready test

for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or
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seizure) entails1") (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)).
Swensen's own belief that Mr. Warren was not armed or
dangerous likewise renders other factors cited by the trial court
as unreasonable bases for upholding the frisk.

"[T]he lateness

of the hour, the area, no other traffic, no residences in area or
open business, [Mr. Warren's] odd and inconsistent explanation of
his activities, officer[f]s belief [that] defendant was engaged
in drugs or prostitution and that people who engage in such
activity usually carry weapons, the officer was alone, the
officer was going to impound defendant's vehicle, and defendant's
previous false statement about the status of his license," R.84,
all occurred prior to Swensen's conclusion that Mr. Warren was
not a threat.

Hence, the frisk was not justified because

"[c]ircumstances allowed [Swensen] time to reassess [his
suspicions] of criminal activity and [his] initial suspicions of
danger without being subjected to 'unnecessary risks in the
performance of [his] duties.'"

State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 666

(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 23).
Additional factors testified to by Swensen underscore the
unreasonableness of the frisk.

For example, Swensen stated that

Mr. Warren pulled over quickly and without incident, got out of
the car willingly to sign his citation, cooperated by giving over
his license readily, and answered his questions about the expired
license and his pre-stop activity without protest.
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R.130[17-19];

see White, 856 P.2d at 666 (holding frisk unconstitutional where
defendant "was cooperative and mellow and followed directions
without protest").

Swensen further testified that Mr. Warren

simply sat in his car while Swensen stepped away to check his
license, and did not otherwise behave in any suspicious manner
indicating that he was a threat.

R.130[19]; see Ybarra, 444 U.S.

at 93 (noting that defendant "made no gestures or other actions
indicative of an intent to commit an assault, and generally
[acted] in a manner that was not threatening").

Swensen also

testified that he did not recognize Mr. Warren as a criminal
known for his violent propensity.

R.130[15]; see Ybarra, 444

U.S. at 93 (noting that officers did not "recognize[ defendant]
as a person with a criminal history"); State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d
291, 293 (Utah 1986) (upholding frisk of defendant who "had been
arrested in conjunction with [an] earlier shooting incident" that
occurred the same day).
In light of the foregoing, the "undisputed facts indicatfe]
that the need for a frisk had dissipated" at the point that
Officer Swensen decided to pat down Mr. Warren for weapons.
White, 856 P.2d at 666.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in

upholding the frisk as lawful under the Fourth Amendment and in
failing to suppress the evidence illegally seized as a result.
Id.; Terry, 392 P.2d at 30; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
II. THE STOP CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE.
24

The State argued below that the evidence should not be
suppressed because it would inevitably have been discovered.
R.131[13].

The State asserted the following:

The officer's testimony was that he was going to
impound the car, and at that point the defendant would
be free to leave however he wished after he'd signed
the citation. However, they'd already started the
impoundment procedure, and the officer was waiting for
back-up to come help him do that.
Once they started searching the car, they would
have found the weapon under the passenger's side
armrest, to which the defendant was charged with. Then
once they found that concealed, dangerous weapon, they
would have going and looked for the defendant, wherever
he was, and the arrested him based on the discovery of
that concealed weapon. Once they arrested him for that
reason, they would have searched his person, they would
have found the drugs that they would have discovered
during the frisk.
So I think under the law as long as they're
pursuing the means which would have inevitably
discovered the evidence, they're justified in doing
that.
Id.

The court did not rule on this aspect of the court's

argument.

R.8 4-85.

The inevitable discovery doctrine, an exception to the
exclusionary rule, was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377
(1984).

The Nix Court stated:

It is clear that the cases implementing the
exclusionary rule "begin with the premise that the
challenged evidence is in some sense the product of
illegal governmental activity." United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d
537 (1980). Of course, this does not end the inquiry.
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the information ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means
. . the deterrence rationale has so little basis that
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the evidence should be received.
Id. at 444.
Recognizing that "[t]his [C]ourt may affirm a lower court's
ruling on any alternative ground ''even though that ground or
theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its
ruling, 11 " Dipoma v. McPhie, 2000 UT App 130, 1 4, 1 P.3d 564
(quotations omitted), this Court should refrain from affirming
the lower court's admission of the evidence seized from Mr.
Warren under the inevitable discovery doctrine; it is
inapplicable because the State did not present any evidentiary
basis for applying the doctrine, and the facts adduced at the
suppression hearing do not otherwise establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the drugs "'would1 have been discovered,"
State ex rel. M.V., 1999 UT App 12, fl 12, 997 P.2d 494 (citation
omitted), such that "the evidence is absolved of the taint" of
prior illegal police conduct.

State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, f

18, 977 P.2d 489.
A. The State Did Not Present Any Evidentiary Basis
Establishing the Existence of an Alleged Gun or Any
Other Weapon.
As to the State's preponderance burden and the quality of
evidence that must be presented, Nix explained that proof of
"inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but
focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready
verification or impeachment."

Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.

This

quality of evidence would "not require a departure from the usual
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burden of proof [by a preponderance of the evidence] at
suppression hearings."

Id.

The State did not meet its burden of

proof because it never presented any testimony at the suppression
hearing about the alleged gun or other evidence that otherwise
supplied an adequate evidentiary basis for applying the
inevitable discovery doctrine.

Id.

First, the searching officer never testified about a gun or
any other weapon at either of the two suppression hearings held
in this case.

See generally R.130[3-22], 131.

Swensen, who

testified at the February 18, 2000, suppression hearing only,
R.130, merely stated during cross-examination that found a "white
plastic twist," i.e. drugs.

R.130[20].

The State did not elicit

any testimony concerning contraband of any sort during its direct
examination of Swensen, let alone testimony about weapons in
general or a gun in particular.

R.130[3-ll].

In the absence of

such testimony, it cannot be said that the evidence is "capable
of ready verification or impeachment."

Nix, 4 67 U.S. at n.5.

Indeed, the alleged gun is not subject to any verification or
cross-examination by either this Court or Mr. Warren.

Id.

The only reference to an alleged gun was made by the
prosecutor at the suppression hearing on March 20, 2000.

R.131.

He did not brief the issue as he "forgot to point it out in [his]
memorandum," R.131[12], and he only made the statement at the
close of his argument in favor of admitting the drug evidence at
issue.

R.131[13].

The prosecutor's statements concerning a gun
27

do not satisfy the Nix standard, however, for they are merely
argument and not properly characterized as "facts capable of
ready verification or impeachment."

Nix, 4 67 U.S. at n.5.

The only other mention of a dangerous weapon of any sort is
in the Information and accompanying Probable Cause Statement.
R.14-16.

The reference is not to the gun alleged by the State.

Count III of the Information alleges that Mr. Warren, "did carry
a concealed dangerous weapon which is not a firearm on his
person, or one that was readily accessible for immediate use,
which was not securely encased, in a place other than his
residence, property, or business under his control."

R.15.

The

Probable Cause Statement alleges:
[t]he statement of Officer S. Wozab that he assisted
Officer Swensen in searching the defendant's vehicle.
Underneath the armrest on the front seat, the Officers
located a knife, two additional pipes, filters, and a
pen tube with residue.
R.16.

Like the prosecutor's statement, however, such evidence is

not the quality of proof necessary under Nix since it is only an
unproved allegation made unilaterally by the State rather than a
"fact[] capable of ready verification or impeachment.''

4 67 U.S.

at n.5.2
Aside from the unclear nature of the alleged weapon found
in Mr. Warren's car, there is nothing in the State's evidence to
establish by a preponderance standard that Mr. Warren carried a
"concealed dangerous weapon" in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
76-10-504 (1999), such that his arrest and subsequent search
would have inevitably followed. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
Section 76-10-504 (1) (a) prohibits the carrying of "a
concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-10-501
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[(1999)], which is not a firearm on his person or one that is
readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely
encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his
residence, property, or business under his control." Except
under the circumstances outlined in 76-10-504 (1) (a), Utah
citizens have a constitutional right to carry a gun. See U.S.
Const, amend. II (Right to Bear Arms); Utah Const. Art. I, § 6
(same).
Assuming for the sake of argument only that the State
established that a gun was located in Mr. Warren's car, it failed
to establish any evidence that it was carried in violation of 7610-504. The State did not present any evidence establishing that
the gun was the sort prohibited by law, see Utah Code Ann. § 7610-501(8) ("[f]irearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun,
sawed-off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is expelled a
projectile by action of an explosive") & 76-10-501(11)
("[h]andgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm of any
description, loaded or unloaded, from which any shot, bullet, or
other missile can be discharged, the length of which, not
including any revolving, detachable, or magazine breech, does not
exceed 12 inches"); or that it was loaded and not properly
encased, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1)(b) ("[a] dangerous
weapon shall not be .considered a concealed dangerous weapon if it
is a firearm which is unloaded and is securely encased").
Also assuming for the sake of argument only that the State
established the presence of a knife, it similarly failed to
establish any evidence that it was possessed in violation of 7610-504. For example, nothing in the evidence establishes whether
the knife was a small pocket knife unlikely to cause serious
injury or death, or something more significant in size and
potential for harm which would qualify it as a "dangerous
weapon." See. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(4) (a) ("[d]angerous
weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or intended
use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife,
or any other item, object, or thing not commonly known'as a
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon: (i) the character of the
instrument, object, or thing; (ii) the character of the wound
produced, if any; (iii) the manner in which the instrument,
object, or thing was used; and (iv) the other lawful purposes
for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used"); see
also State v. Puamire, 898 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 1995), cert,
denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995) (defendant's knife, which was
about 9 *s inches long including 4 H inch blade, was dangerous
weapon under 76-10-504).
Whether a gun or a knife, the State further failed to
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In short, the State did not present "demonstrated historical
facts capable of ready verification,'' Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5,
due to the inconsistency between the State's argument at the
suppression hearing alleging the presence of a gun, R.131[13],
the Information's reference to a "concealed dangerous weapon
which is not a firearm," R.15, the Probable Cause Statement's
reference to a "knife," R.16, and the absence of any testimony
concerning a gun or weapon from Swensen, R.130[3-22].
467 U.S. at 444.
weapon.

See Nix,

Indeed, it failed to even identify the alleged

At best, the allegation of a dangerous weapon is

establish any evidence establishing that weapon was "concealed
and "dangerous," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(1)(a) ("concealed
dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that is covered,
hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not be
aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate
use"); that it was "readily accessible for immediate use," see
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(14) (if [r] eadily accessible for
immediate use" means that a firearm or other dangerous weapon is
carried on the person or within such close proximity and in such
a manner that it can be retrieved and used as readily as if
carried on the person"); not "securely encased," see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-501(17) ("[s]ecurely encased" means not readily
accessible for immediate use, such as held in a gun rack, or in a
closed case or container, whether or not locked, or in a trunk or
other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including a glove box
or console box"); or that it was kept in an illegal place, see
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1)(a) (prohibiting carrying concealed
dangerous weapon in "place other than [defendant's] residence,
property, or business under his control").
Where the State failed to present any "demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment,"
Nix, 468 U.S. at n.5, regarding whether Mr. Warren carried a
"concealed dangerous weapon" in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7610-504, it did not meet its preponderance burden of proof.
Accordingly, there is no evidentiary basis for the application of
the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
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"speculative," and does not rise to the preponderance standard
required at suppression hearings.

Id. at n.5.

Hence, the State

did not present an adequate evidentiary basis for the application
of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Id.

B. The Evidence Presented by the State Does Not
Otherwise Establish That the Drugs Inevitably Would
Have Been Discovered.
In addition to the foregoing, the inevitable discovery
doctrine does not apply because the evidence presented by the
State does not otherwise establish that the drugs "'would1 have
been discovered."

State ex rel. M.V. , 1999 UT App 12, SI 12

(citation omitted).
The State asserted below that, after discovering the gun in
the course of the inventory search incident to the impound of Mr.
Warren's vehicle, Mr. Warren would have been arrested on the
basis of the allegedly concealed gun.

R.131[13].

The State

opined that the drugs would have been discovered on Mr. Warren's
person during the search incident to arrest.

Id.

Such a

speculative leap as to what might have happened, however, does
not "absolve[]" the illegally seized evidence of the "taint"
caused by the violation of Mr. Warren's Fourth Amendment rights.
James, 1999 UT App 17, f 18; see supra Points I.A. and I.B.
The State's argument fails because it tenuously assumes that
the drugs found on Mr. Warren during the illegal frisk would
still be on him by the time the officers had inventoried the car,
found the alleged gun, and then decided to arrest and search him.
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Common sense and Swensen's testimony, however, dictate a more
likely scenario, where Mr. Warren would have disposed of the
small twist before the officers got around to arresting and
searching him.

For example, Swensen testified that he did not

intend to arrest Mr. Warren on the traffic citations after he
decided to impound his car.

R.130[22].

This means that Mr.

Warren was free to wander around, even leave, the site of the
stop while Swensen was preoccupied with the inventory search.
This would give Mr. Warren ample opportunity to dispose of the
twist.

Indeed, such a small item could covertly and easily be

cast out of sight (i.e. into bushes, in the gutter, behind a
building or car) without detection by the officers.

The fact

that it was not daylight at the time of the stop would have
served as additional cover for Mr. Warren.

R.130[5].

By the

time the officers got around to arresting and searching him for
the alleged gun, he would no longer have any contraband on his
person.
Mr. Warren's opportunity to discard the twist and,
consequently, it's uncertain discovery, distinguishes this case
from State ex rel M.V., 1999 UT App 104, wherein this Court
upheld the admission of a knife under the inevitable discovery
doctrine.

Id. at SI 13.

In that case, an officer stopped M.V., a

juvenile, as he walked with another juvenile male through a high
crime area at 11:30 a.m. on a school day.
companion ran off.

Id.

Id. at SI 2.

M.V.'s

M.V. had his hands in his pockets.
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Id.

at SI 3.

The officer frisked M.V. and found a package of

cigarettes.

Id.

The officer asked M.V. if he had anything else;

M.V. responded that he had a knife tucked in his pants.

Id.

M.V. then gave puzzling explanations as to why he was not in
school.

Id. at 1 4.

Because of his responses, the officer

"called dispatch to verify M.V.fs name and status, and learned of
a juvenile pick-up order on M.V.

Upon receiving this

information, the officer took M.V. into custody and transported
him to the Youth Detention Center."

Id. at 1 5.

On appeal, the State conceded it was "a close call as to
whether a Terry frisk [was] justified."

Id. at 5 11.

It argued,

however, and this Court agreed, that the evidence was admissible
under the inevitable discovery doctrine.

Id.

This Court

reasoned that "[u]pon his arrival at youth detention, M.V. would
routinely be searched in accordance with the administrative
rules [,]

...

a separate independent investigation that

inevitably would have led to the discovery of the knife hidden in
M.V. ! s pants."

Id. at 5 13.

The inventory search of Mr. Warren's car does not amount to
the same sort of "independent investigation that inevitably

would

have led to the discovery of" the twist hidden in his clothing.
Id. (emphasis added).

Unlike Mr. Warren, M.V. never had an

opportunity to discard the knife since the officer's attention
was focused on him during the entire encounter up until the
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discovery of the knife.

Id. atflfl2-3.

The knife had already

been discovered at the time that the officer diverted his
attention to call dispatch.

Id. at ffl 3-5.

Therefore, the

discovery of M.V. f s knife was truly "inevitable" and its
admission would not nullify Fourth Amendment safeguards.

See

Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (balancing "interest of society in deterring
unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries
receive all probative evidence of a crime").
In light of the foregoing, discovery of the twist cannot be
said to be "inevitable."

See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.

At best, the

State's argument only speculatively suggests that it "'could1 or
'might' have been discovered" assuming that Mr. Warren would take
no action at all to dispose of the contraband.
M.V., 1999 UT App 104, f 12 (citation omitted).
satisfy the State's preponderance burden.
444.

State ex rel
This does not

See Nix, 467 U.S. at

Consequently, the inevitable discovery doctrine does not

apply in this case.

Id.

Indeed, application of the doctrine to

the present situation "would swallow the exclusionary rule by
weakening the rule's [deterrent] effect."

James, 1999 UT App 17,

f 18 (citation omitted); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Warren respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the lower court's order admitting the
evidence unconstitutionally seized from his person in violation
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of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and A m c i e
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
11IL STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
Plaintiff,
I

£/U C

Uh^

Case No.
Count No
Honorable.
Clerk
Reporter.
Bailiff

v-tf^

i a I 2 ~i 16 (J

Date.

Defei

^ / f 2 33J y
£ T

SJli/Jrt^

Q 1 he motion of
to enter" a judgement of convictior i for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly in • granted Q jenied There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, A plea of guilty;
• plea of no contest; of the offense of _
, a felony
of the yf^ degree, • a cla^s
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by t) ^TZAJU ^ U - r a n d the State being represented by ^
U/I4f&\ghcw adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now senfehced to a. term in the Utah State Prison:
•
¥j
I•
•
•
•
•
•
A
Q

to a maximum mandatory term of
years and wl lich may be life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount ot $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
_., to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
sucn sentence is IO run concurrently witn
;
such sentence is to run consecutively with
(Sirf^QA ( f^
upon motion of • State, Q Defense, Q Court, Court(s)

_

D/)
are hereby dismissed.

•
•

L II

(I

Defendant is granted a stay of above ( • prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where.defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment'
Commitment shall issue
DATED this
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ADDENDUM B
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District Attorney for Sau u.- MATTHEW G. NIELSEN (726:
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 3 2000
SALT LAKE COUNTY
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(

(

By.
I'l dip i ill y CI art

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COT JRT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMEN I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PI an il iff,

FINDINGS OFF AC l .\
CONCLUSIONS OF T *

I' S

ER IC I AR\ IS W ARREN,

Case No S ^ U V ^ J J M ^ S
Judge M i l l eve

Defendant.

1 he above-entitled ease came before this Coin t on h Liu li JJ, H H H I

„ _

r

defendant's motion to suppress evidence !he State of Utah was represented H\ ?TS row ^**
David E. Yocom and, Matthew G, Nielsen, and the defendant was represented by Otis Sterling.
1

had previously taken testimonial evidence on defendant's motion to suppress evidence

on February 18, 200u. Inerefore, this Court hereby mak.es the following findings of fact and
cnik.luMnns o f Lis ».'

FINDINGS OF F \
1)

At approxm

• -* ,.,<:

the Salt Lake City Police Department was on general patrol duties in the area of 350 East and
200 South, when he noticed a car stopped the side of the road at abot

.:>outh and 200 East.

<

2)

The car was occupied and driven by the defendant. Officer Swensen saw an

unidentified individual leaning partially into the open passenger side door and then shut the door
and walk away as the vehicle drove off. Officer Swensen never saw the unidentified individual
inside of the car and had no reason to believe he was a passenger.
3)

Officer Swensen was suspicious that a drug deal or prostitution was occurring

because of the late hour and the area was not residential and no businesses were open at that
hour.
4)

Officer Swensen followed the defendant's vehicle and then pulled it over after the

defendant failed, twice, to signal for lane changes. Officer Swensen informed the defendant of
the reason for the stop and requested a driver's license. The defendant failed to produce a valid
driver's license, but stated he did have a valid license.
5)

Officer Swensen briefly asked defendant what had occurred with the unidentified

person that was seen leaning into the defendant's car. The defendant stated he was out looking
for boxes because he was helping his sister move and that he had just dropped off the
unidentified male who was his friend. The questioning on the matter was terminated and the
whole conversation with the defendant lasted no more than one or two minutes.
6)

Officer Swensen then returned to his patrol car and ran a license check on the

defendant and was informed that the defendant's license was denied for reinstatement fees.
Officer Swensen then re-approached the vehicle and asked the defendant to step out of the car in
order to have him sign a citation for the traffic violations and because he was going to impound
the vehicle due to the defendant's failure to have a valid license.
7)

When the defendant stepped out of the vehicle, Officer Swensen as part of his

routine performed a "Terry" frisk for weapons. During the frisk a small white plastic twist fell

from beneath tht cli'lli in but1 w r ill 'ilhiiiiil Hi lin mm tht* t\i n ,1 In In1 11 imimllul Mihilam i
Officer Swensen p

:e defendant under arrest. A more 'thorough search was then performed

wherein ihidiliuuru «

MUMuv

J "ajinLinciis mid

>J

Ii/ai ulass

DILH IH„U

Inuiki on Jetendanl

person.
CONCLUSIONS OF

/

The brief questioning of the defendant regarding the 'unidentified individual seen learn ny
into the defendant's vehicle did not exceed the scope of the initial 'traffic stop in violation of tht:
Fourth Amendment. Such hnH,<|iii1,slioiimjk,l vus irdsonahlc Jiiil li a SUM I1 in ihc officers persoi i;i I
observation and suspicion that defendant was engaged in other criminal activity such as drugs or
prostitution
The brief "Terry"' frisk of defendant for weapons was not conducted in violation of the
Fourth. -..,ei.Ji;:~,\. . >. ... .^

,»v^. ua-,u ,ii dn, .oi no neve the defendant had

weapons, Uie search was supported b> on uujeciiv. re:;-- -

'

"frndlanl

ir-.

armed and dangerous The search was only conducted for officer safety and was supported by
||U

fodoH ino lac'S

Hn

I.Hi n i '

Hil (In III i il 11 (In

lieu

i ] n nlh|( i In | ! | i i

i|. i i i s i d t i l l l CS ill At , M " [ '

open business, defendant's odd and inconsistent explanation of his activities, officers belief
dereiuldin Has engaged uii unif/i 01 pn 'iiiiuiirm ami dial people vino engage In such acti\ ity
usually carry weapons, the officer was alone, the officer was going to impound defendant's
"\ ehicle, and defendant s previous false statement about the status of his license.

ORDER
Based on the abovefindingsof fact and conclusions of law it is hereby ordered that the
defendants motion to suppress evidence be denied.
DATED this _ ^ ? d a y of March 2000.
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